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Democracy Promotion and the EU, US Formulas: 
Photo Opportunities or Potential Rivalries? 
 
Imtiaz Hussain
1
 
Why do we think more of the United States (US) than the European Union (EU) in 
discussing Afghani or Iraqi democratization, and EU more than US when it is East 
European? Should not democratization be the same? 
A comparative study asks what democracy has historically meant in the two 
regions, how democratization has been spelled out, why instruments utilized differ, and 
democracy within global leadership contexts. Neither treats democracy as a vital interest, 
but differences abound: (a) While the US shifted from relative bottom-up to top-down 
democracy, the EU added bottom-up to its top-down approach; (b) the US interprets 
democracy as the ends of other policy interests, the EU treats it as the means to other goals; 
and (c) flexible US instruments contrast with rigid EU counterparts.  
Among the implications: (a) the 4-stage US approach reaches globally wider than 
EU’s multi-dimensional counterpart, but EU’s regional approach sinks deeper than the 
US’s; (b) human rights find better EU than US anchors; (c) whereas the US approach 
makes intergovernmental actions the sine qua non of democratization, EU’s 
intergovernmental, transnational, and supranational admixture promotes quid pro quo 
dynamics and incremental growth; and (d) competitive democratization patterns creates 
lock-ins for both recipient and supplier countries. 
 
 
 
Puzzle: 
 
Scanning the democratization map, why is the United States (US) behind the Afghani or Iraqi steering 
wheel and not the European Union (EU), and similarly why the EU behind East European’s efforts and 
not US? Neither the EU conveyed disinterest in democratizing Afghanistan and Iraq nor the US East 
European countries, but is the democratization formula the same? Must it be so?  
A first-cut response might point to geographical proximity pushing the EU more into East Europe 
than Afghanistan and Iraq, and strategic interests driving the US into Afghanistan and Iraq, much as they 
led the US into Germany and Japan after World War II. Different triggers conceivably produced 
dissimilar democratization formulas, but one might argue if democracy is the bottom-line in both, why 
worry, would not the end-product be similar? Yet, by reassessing a critical assumption that EU and US 
have similar meanings of democracy, other pertinent questions arise: How do they go about the 
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democratization processes? What instruments do they utilize? Where in the larger scheme of internal and 
international interests do they position democracy? 
Whether the EU and US have been on the same policy wavelength since the Cold War ended or 
not is a broader literary debate.2 Much has been written about how they compete over trade policies and 
market access,3 respond differently to environmental protection and human rights safeguards,4 and take 
distinctive stands over, for example, the place and role of the United Nations or other organizational 
visions,5 the need for regime-change in defectively structured countries, the efficiency of collective action 
over individual state pursuits,6 and increasingly over an area of enormous and successful past 
cooperation--the North American Treaty Organization (NATO).7  Does democracy also show a 
transatlantic divergence? 
 Taking a stab at the transatlantic democratization puzzle, this study explores what democracy 
means on either side, how is it to be attained, and where to place it among other state interests. Four 
sections address the definition of democracy, processes of democratization, the instruments of 
democratization, and placement of democracy in the larger sphere. Conclusions are drawn and 
implications projected thereafter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
For a cautiously optimistic overview, see Roy H. Ginsberg, “U.S.-EU relations:the commercial, political, and 
security dimensions,” The State of the European Union, vol. 4: Deepening and Widening, eds. Peierre-Henri Laurent 
and Marc Maresceau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 297-316.  
3
A number of articles address these in Thomas L. Ilgen, ed., Hard power, Soft Power of transatlantic Relations 
(Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate,  2006);  
4
For the orientational difference over the environment, see David G. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2001); and Heike Schröder, Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol: An Analysis of Negotiation Dynamics in 
International Negotiations (Münster, LIT Verlag, 2001).  
5
Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006).  
6
See the collection of articles in David M. Andrews, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations 
After Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christoph Bail, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and 
Reinhardt Rummel, EU-US Relations: Balancing the Partnership: Taking a Medium-term Perspective (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verladsgesellschaft, 1997);Christina V. Balis and Simon Serfaty, eds., Visions of America and 
Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2004); Gustav E. Gustenau, Otmar Höll, and Thomas Nowotny, eds, Europe-USA: Diverging Partners 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft, 2006); Beatruice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and 
Costs (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996); Sarwar A. Kashmeri, America and Europe after 9/11 
and Iraq: The Great Divide (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007); and Tod Lindberg, ed., Beyond Paradise and Power: 
Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005);  
7On the good, ’ole years, see Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago, 1962) also Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York, 
NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1968). On its post-Cold War difficulties, see Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, 
Atlantic Bridges: America’s New European Allies (Lanham, MD: Roman Littlefield, 2006); Jan Hallenberg and 
Håkan Karlsson, eds., Changing Transatlantic Relations: Do the US, the EU and Russia Form a New Strategic 
Triangle? (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006); Richard E. Rupp, NATO:After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing 
Decline (Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Stanley R. Sloan,  NATO and 
Transatlantic Relations in the 21
st
 Century: Crisis, Continuity or Change? Headline Series, #324 (New York, NY: 
Foreign Policy Association, Fall 2002); and S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin, NATO: After Fifty 
Years (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001). 
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Meaning of Democracy: 
Beginning with generic definitions, this section then traces how democracy evolved structurally on either 
side of the Atlantic. 
 
Working Definition: 
Stemming from demos and kratos, the Greek for people and rule, respectively, democracy represents a 
different form of governance but whose minimum qualifications still remain contentious. In his historical 
study of the two “comings” of democracy, John Dunn succinctly describes democracy as “a state in which 
sovereignty . . . is exercised by a council composed of the common multitude.”8 Jack Plano and Milton 
Greenberg, in turn, distinguish between “direct and indirect democracy,”9 while Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Terry Lynn Karl specify conditions of democracy. Among them: a regime or system of governance, a 
public realm of norms of choices, citizenship, competition, majority rule, cooperation, and 
representativeness.10 From democracy’s second “coming,” beginning in the18th Century and spilling on 
to the 20
th
 Century, George Sørensen highlights the role of civil society, thus introducing the well-spring 
of more sublime and subtle wrinkles.11 
 As part and parcel of this second coming, John Stuart Mill and Joseph Schumpeter placed plural 
voting and people’s will--two relevant wrinkles--under the microscope. With plural voting, Mill argued, 
the vote of the “wiser and more talented” would become more useful than that of “the ignorant and less 
able,” even though the end-goal of liberty is sought by both.12 Schumpeter similarly challenged the notion 
of democracy in Dunn’s first coming, that is, in classical Greece, as representing “the will of the people” 
seeking “the common good,” when in practice it basically creates an “institutional arrangement” by which 
“individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”13 
Levels of education, institutional capacities, and how power is translated can take the people’s will and 
the search for common goods in entirely different directions, breeding varieties of democracy. 
 Based on these extrapolations and nuances, Robert A. Dahl’s “rule of the many,” what he called 
polyarchy instead of democracy,14 offers a widely respected political democracy framework of 3 
opportunities, 8 institutional guarantees, and 3 dimensions.15 Citizens must have opportunities, he argues, 
to (a) formulate preferences; (b) convey these preferences publicly through individual and collective 
                                                     
8
John Dunn, Democracy: A History (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2005), 66.  
9
Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1993, 9
th
 ed.), 8-9.  
10Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What democracy is . . . and is not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 
(Summer 1991).  
11
George Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, Dilemma in 
World Politics Series (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 7.  
12
From ibid.  
13
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, NY: Harper, 1947, 2
nd
 ed.), 269.  
14
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), ch. 1; 
also see his On Democracy (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1998); and the original, A Preface to 
Democratic Theory (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1956).  
15By “widely respected,” I mean serving as the well-spring of theoretical formulations, as in Samuel P. Huntington, 
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991), esp. 6-9; Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization, 11-6; Renske Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions: 
Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 14-22; as well as Albert 
Somit and Steven A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (Houndsmills, 
Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 28-9. The list is only partial.  
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means; and (c) have those preferences considered by the government. These must be augmented by 
institutional guarantees to (a) form and join organizations freely: (b) express liberty; (c) vote; (d) be 
eligible for public office; (e) compete for support and vote by political leaders; (f) provide alternate 
sources of information; (g) have free and fair elections; and (h) make government policies depend on 
votes and other forms of expression. The emerging political democracy, he argues, permits (a) 
competition, (b) participation, and (c) civil and political liberties. In short, dahlian democracy features 
contestation and participation. 
 
Transatlantic Evolution: 
Shifting from definitions to transatlantic playing fields shows how quite different democratic structures 
developed. On one shore emerged a more top-down democracy, on the other a relatively more bottom-up 
counterpart. Both top-down and bottom-up concepts expose hypothetically different dynamics and state 
structures: top-down reflects bourgeoisie interests and greater state centralization, bottom-up mass 
interests and decentralization.16 Arguably at stake were land ownership and vested interests. The more the 
land belonged to the aristocrats, the more likely the route to democracy would be top-down and the state 
centralized. Great Britain is the classic example.17  Conversely, the more common people had access to 
land ownership, the more likely the route to democracy would show a bottom-up flavor, without fully 
becoming bottom-up, and greater respect for decentralized government. The United States fits this bill.18 
Similarly with vested interests: the longer land is owned, or a business is operated, the more vested the 
interests become; and contrariwise, the more recent land ownership or brevity of business enterprises, the 
less the vested interests. The deeper the cleavages, the higher the chances the society will be top-down, 
and likewise, the more shallow those cleavages, the more likelihood of a bottom-up orientation. 
 Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted several of these patterns during his 1831-32 US visit, left some 
rather striking US-European comparisons, or rather contrasts. He associated sovereignty, for example, 
with the people in the United States but with monarchs and princes.19 Since there was a lot of land to own 
in the US, people spread out, built townships and associations, and lived as if born-free of vested 
interests; by contrast, European land was limited, spoken for, and managed from the center by princes, 
nobles, or monarchs. With its bottom-up and decentralized structures and fewer vested interests, the 
United States contrasted the European top-down, centralized counterpart where vested interests were 
dense and deep. Exceptions, of course, exist: land-ownership was concentrated on too few a group 
originally in the United States, even creating an aristocracy, for example, in the southern states; while in 
Europe, England’s 16th Century enclosure movement invited mass participation and democracy far ahead 
of bottom-up US,
20
 and certainly continental Europe. One caricaturizes a stratified, and thereby socially 
more closed Europe, another a more horizontal, thus more socially open, US. 
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How both approaches are defined depends, in part, on the context. My usage here is similar to Paul G. Buchanan’s, 
with top-down representing “a gradual liberalization and political opening followed by competitive elections,” and 
bottom-up “when civil society mobilizes and expands the range of its demands while moving to secure a greater 
voice in the governmental decision making process.” See Buchanan, “From military rule in Argentina and Brazil,” 
Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), 224, but see 223-33. Other definitions later in 
this paper is consistent with these. 
17
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and : Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966), ch. 1. 
18
Ibid., ch. 3.  
19
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Richard D. Heffner (New York, NY: New American Library, 
1956), part I, ch. 3.  
20
On enclosures, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of 
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1974), 109-29. 
7 
 
 
 These distinctions matter today. Since citizenship carries the right to vote, immigrants acquire 
citizenship faster in the United States than they do in Europe. The European case is complicated by EU 
membership. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty adopted European citizenship, European immigrants in 
other European countries cannot always get the right to vote or be elected. At the time of the treaty, only 
five countries permitted this (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden), seven did not 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg), while three lay in between (Portugal, 
Spain, and the United Kingdon).21 Only until very recently, blood was the only passport to German 
citizenship; but birth and naturalization have always been the US counterparts. Even though Abraham 
Lincoln’s democracy “of the people, by the people, and for the people” was fulfilled several decades after 
his time when women got the right to vote in 1920 and Afro-Americans in 1964, US citizens can make 
stronger claims to Lincoln’s expectations than many Europeans can in their own country. 
 Even more relevant to the present study, since the US had elements of democracy from its very 
birth while European countries had to adapt various monarchies to democracy, it is quite ironic how the 
US is more a regime-change advocate today than the European countries. One of the triggers behind US-
led democratization today is the need for regime-change, evident in Afghanistan and Iraq; yet when the 
European Community encouraged the East European democratization movements in the 1980s, we did 
not hear as much of regime-change trigger as the deployment of inter-governmental, transnational, and 
non-governmental agencies to fuel democracy-mindedness. 
 How democracy evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, then, demonstrates quite different 
adjustments, with class barriers spearheading the inclusion processes across stratified Europe and gender, 
race, as well as immigration the agents of making US democracy more representative. Whereas the 
slower European adjustment created more representative institutions, for example, the British House of 
Commons, the US adjustment proved more open to diversification--to include other groups.  
 
Process of Democratization: 
To capture both different perspectives and various nuances, democratization is disaggregated into four 
strands: (a) meaning of democratization; (b) nation versus state-building distinction; (c) functional levels 
of analysis; and (d) pathways in the literature. 
 
Meaning of Democratization:  
Whereas the US initiates democratization through regime-change, European countries increasingly 
nurture ongoing democratic processes. In the relevant literatures, regime-change is treated under 
democratic transition, while democratic processes fall under consolidation. Democratization flows from 
both. 
 According to Huntington, democratization involves three broad tasks: (a) end the authoritarian 
regime; (b) install a democratic regime; and (c) consolidate the democratic regime.22 Whereas the United 
States makes the first the necessary condition, European countries, through the EU, prioritize the third, 
believing regime-change can be induced through policy changes than military-driven regime-removal. 
Whereas US intervention knows no geographical boundaries, European democratic consolidation shows a 
rough geographically concentric pattern reflecting proximity: greater emphasis on neighboring countries 
than on distant ones. 
                                                     
21Stefano Allievi, “Muslims and politics,” Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, eds. Brigitte Maréchal, Allievi, Felice 
Dassetto, and Jørgen Nielsen (Boston, MA: Brill, 2003), 184-5.  
22
Huntington, op. cit., 35.  
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 Just from the meaning of the term, we find two very different orientations. Whereas force-usage 
changes the status quo in the US conceptualization, the EU counterpart threatens the status-quo less, and 
in fact, is willing to work within it. Similarly, the geographical open-ended US engagement differs from 
the proximity-driven EU meaning. Both these differences spell a third: the nuts and bolts of 
democratization may be less important to the US than to the EU, meaning by simply and officially 
changing the ideology suffices for the US but may not satisfy the EU. 
 Not to say similarities do not exist. Both believe the end-goal should not only be democracy, but 
also that democracy is implicitly a better and more efficient form of government. The US would not want 
a regime changed by democracy if democracy was not capable of offering a higher threshold of 
performances or satisfying interests better; and the EU would not admit members unless a democratic 
government existed, capable of fulfilling the necessary policy adjustments. 
 
Nation versus State-building: Functional Identity 
Neither nation-building nor state-building are new labels. Nation-building enjoys a long literary history 
reflecting the evolution of citizenship,23 and particularly so in post-World War II newly independent 
countries;24 state-building also captures transitional countries,25 whether shifting from conflict, 
colonialism, or authoritarianism. What is fascinating in reviving both terms is the explicit association with 
democratization, rather than leaving that connection implicit or as an assumption.26 Among the 
implications: (a) the greater distinction between state and society; and (b) possible linkages between both, 
perhaps as stages toward democracy or in some sequential fashion. 
Francis Fukuyama’s distinctions between state-building and nation-building take us farther. 
Whereas state-building to him is concerned with “creating or strengthening such government institutions 
as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collecting agencies, health and education systems, 
and the like,” nation-building prioritizes “creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties 
that bind people together as a nation.”27 Returning to some prior discussions, state-building reflects top-
down dynamics and nation-building bottom-up. With the US preferring the former and the EU 
emphasizing both, we notice another historical reversal: As the US itself became more bottom-up after 
extending voting rights, it increasingly advocated top-down democracy elsewhere; but the top-down 
European pattern, though not completely reversed, is certainly more diversified across Europe today than 
ever before. 
How do we explain these changes? One response is to distinguish between the domestic and 
external contexts, between domestic and foreign policy interests. The US was bottom-up only in 
comparison to the typical European state, but as soon as voting rights became more universal by the 
                                                     
23
See Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1977).   
24
Shawkat Ali, Nation Building, Development, and Administration: A Third World Perspective (Lahore: Aziz 
Brothers, 1979); and Henriette Riegler, ed., Nation Building: Between National Sovereignty and 
InternationalIntervention (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005);  
25
Volker Bornschier, State-Building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration (Cambridge, U: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Stefano Bianchini and George Schöpflin, State Building in the Balkans: 
Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21
st
 Century (Ravenna: Longo, 1998); and Su-Hoon Lee, State-building in the 
Contemporary Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). 
26
For example, Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006).  
27Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-building 101,” The Atlantic Monthly (January-February 2004), 159-62, from: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/1/fukuyama.htm and -----, State-Building: Governance and Order in the 21
st
 
Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
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1920s, exporting democracy climbed the policy-making agenda ranks. Woodrow Wilson spoke of 
“making the world safe for democracy” almost as the suffragette movement entered its last protest lap 
before acquiring voting rights. Championing democracy abroad by one of the few countries to have been 
born with democratic propensities was as natural as the growing global power distribution change was to 
pushing the US to claim world leadership at the League of Nations. Perhaps the two trends were more 
formally related: Global leadership was transiting from purely military determination towards the 
demonstration of a domestic, “civilized” order to ostensibly “less civilized” others; and certainly as a 
unique form of government, in a world filled with colonies and mandates ruled largely by European 
empires, the US could champion the new order. Democratization distinguished the old world from the 
new. 
Europe’s bottom-up supplement to a top-down appraisal depended on a domestic-international 
link. Having acquired democracy though trials and errors across centuries, West European countries knew 
of no other way for democracy to be established than fidgeting with democratization procedures. Regime-
change was not only not an option since it was a policy approach of the strong, but also an illegitimate 
democratic action since it involved military intervention, which, a long line of philosophers from Dunn’s 
second coming, such as Immanuel Kant through his 1795 Perpetual Peace,28 refused to associate with 
democracy: Democracy could accept defensive wars, but not initiate them. Here too the relative power 
factor also proved influential. European countries were not interested in seeking global leadership roles, 
least of all resort to force on the same continent or with former colonies. They sought an economic club, 
had a different democratic stripe to demonstrate, and believed it pragmatic to pursue a two-track top-
down, bottom-up approach to fulfill their goals. 
While regime-change necessitates a functional state immediately, state-building must pave the 
way for nation-building, thus creating a four-stage sequence; but when regime-change is peacefully 
induced, both nation-building and state (re)-building must resonate off each other. In exemplifying the 
former, the United States has paid more attention to establishing institutions first, whether in Germany, 
Japan, Afghanistan, or Iraq, leaving for citizens and groups to anchor their activities and expectations on 
those institutions. Similarly, in accenting the latter, the EU’s two-track approach involves institutional 
support for proper policy adjustments and civil society mobilization, since the policies must ultimately 
reflect majority opinion. A closer appraisal suggests top-down institutional support counts more for 
membership than the presence of civil society. 
 
Approaches and Levels of Analysis: 
As the subject of both top-down and bottom-up approaches, democratization distinguishes between levels 
of analysis, at least implicitly.  Top-down democratization, according to Richard Youngs,29 incorporates 
the institutions of the state, along with political parties, playing a vital role in the aggregation of interests, 
and one or more levels of local government. He calls this the political-institutional sphere within a 
political society. It mirrors the lockean political contract of democracy being by, of, and for the few, at 
least in the initial stages. On the other hand, bottom-up democracy addresses “the associational, non-
office-seeking activity located in the space between the state and the family unit.” This designates the 
civil society sphere. 
                                                     
28
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, introduced by Nicolas Murray Butler (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1939); also see Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and world politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 
(December 1986):1150-69.  
29
Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 14-5.  
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Just as the state can also invoke an international level through the combined action of states, or a 
regional level with a smaller group of like-minded countries, the society level includes both multinational 
and transnational corporations, or corporations and non-governmental organizations. While the top-down 
approach does not prohibit society-level groups, less attention is paid to them in democratization tasks; 
while bottom-up approaches remain indifferent to state-level engagements and initiatives, even to 
international organizations, like the UN, they nevertheless adapt well. 
Approaches and levels of analysis need not be cast in stone just as the EU and US need not 
represent polar opposite democratization formulas. In an age with unprecedented globalizing forces, and 
the simultaneous expansion of liberalization opening limitless opportunities for private sector enterprises, 
the top-down and bottom-up approaches may face many more parallel actions in the middle than at the 
top or the bottom: non-governmental organizations move in and out, as do corporations, not to mention 
international organizations, tourists, reporters, and lots of others in their individual capacities. Yet, the 
point of initiation remains the key distinction: Whether institutional imperatives or civil society pressures 
serve as catalyzers, democratization matters. Without the former, the result would be anomie; and without 
both simultaneously, the institution-building and civil society growth may bypass each other, creating 
greater harm. 
When the US began with selected leadership and institutions in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq, it was able to determine democratization thresholds, essentially stages, to which the subsequent 
exposure to a consumer culture anchored citizens. That Germans and Japanese did better than Afghanis 
and Iraqis has less to do with the democratization formula than the idiosyncratic mix: Germans and 
Japanese had less to worry about ethnic rivalries than Afghanis and Iraqis. Yet, this points precisely to the 
one-size-fits-all democratization problem: cultures have the capacity to adapt, but in forcing the pace or 
streamlining different adaptation rates, the top-down approach risks losing legitimacy. Even by 
successfully adapting to the US, Germany and Japan retained their own styles in many arenas and with 
which they even challenge the US today, indicating the propensity of a top-down approach to produce 
competitors even as homogenization takes place. Afghani and Iraqi attempts to do likewise keep being 
undermined by stricter deadlines and an army of democratization scholars constantly alarmed when 
unfolding patterns drift from paradigm expectations (Larry Diamond in Iraq is a notable example). 
The EU faces the same one-size-fits-all outcome but with better safeguards. Its bottom-up surge 
faces softer, rather than dramatic, institutional changes at the top, and can also reach out to EU institutions 
incrementally from the very start. In the end, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Slovenes, among others, look 
like streamlined Europeans, as ethnicity distinctions get toned down (compared to what it was during the 
Cold War); yet another destabilizing force appears, based on economic status. East Germans, for example, 
continue to look like the impoverished East Germans of the Cold War era rather than upwardly-mobile or 
prosperous post-Cold War Germans. Unlike the ethnic-conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, those between 
East and West Europeans have been relatively dampened; and unlike the US-based top-down approach 
which comes without any social or economic safeguards, the EU has compensatory programs, such as the 
regional development funds, which, though tortuously slow in operationalizing, can be resorted to against 
brewing class-based or income-based differences in transitional countries. 
 
Pathways in the Literatures: 
Even though this is a comparative study of EU-US democracy, democratization pathways are not always 
country-specific. A proposed paradigm utilized in Europe does not convert it into a European pathway. 
Pathway proposals seek maximum applicability. In that sense, Table 1 plucks out four illustrative 
pathways.  
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TABLE 1: DEMOCRATIZATION PATHWAYS: EU-US COMPARISONS 
 
Youngs’s Pathway: 
 
Liberalize civil society 
↓ 
Liberalize economic spheres (market reforms) 
↓ 
Promote good governance 
(attack corruption) 
 
Fukuyama’s Pathway: 
 
Stability through humanitarian assistance, 
infrastructure rebuilding, and economic 
development 
↓ 
Build self-sustaining economic and political 
institutions necessary for democracy 
Pridham’s Pathway: 
 
 
Inaugurate democratization 
↓ 
Decision to liberalize democracy 
↓ 
Constituent phase 
Paris’s IBL Pathway: 
 
Rebuild institutions: 
(a) prepare conditions for elections 
(b) create an electoral system favorable to 
moderate groups 
(c) develop a stable civil society 
(d) discourage extremism 
(e) promote conducive economic policies 
(f) rebuild effective state institutions 
↓ 
Construct liberal structures 
 
 
Both Youngs and Pridham applied their pathways to the EU, Pridham to the US as well. 
Fukuyama’s two-step bottom-up nation-building approach and Roland Paris’s institutions-before-
liberalization (IBL) top-down, state-building post-conflict paradigm, offer alternate gleanings, the former 
carrying a nation-building, thus bottom-up bias, reminiscent of the EU, the latter prototypically US. 
One notices both the EU and US depicting half-way positions. While the EU embracing the 
bottom-up Rousseauvian approach, without making it the only element of any democratization strategy, 
the US accents the top-down Lockean approach, without abandoning bottom-up possibilities nor 
incorporating them into the formal processes. When push comes to shove, the US would much rather 
adopt the top-down approach while the EU does not have a choice since streamlining EU policies can 
only be supervised from the top by the EU while bottom-up forces remain intrinsic EU agents of 
democratization given the way the EU consciously seeks devolution and promotes rural or regional 
development plans.30 Whereas the EU begins with forces already on the ground, that is, networks of 
extant relations, the US prefers the drawing board as its starting point, that is, starting from scratch--both 
reflecting their own historical experiences, the European by echoing the long and arduous transitions from 
authoritarian rule to democracy, the US by resonating how its own Founding Fathers constructed a quick 
constitution for a born-free country, essentially building a new regime rather than adapting to an old one. 
Expectations were matched by concrete developments. Youngs goes on to show how the EU 
strategy was applied to East Europe in the 1980s. Even though the US first blew the whistle on 
democratizing East Europe through President Carter’s human rights comments in the late-1970s, the EU 
played a more dominant role and exerted greater long-term influence over East European countries. That 
is not to say East European sentiments belong hook, line, and sinker in the EU camp, since the “new 
                                                     
30On the EU’s top-down policy approach, see Martis Brusis, “The instrumental use of European Union 
conditionality:regionalization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” East Europe Politics and Societies 19, no. 2 
(Spring 2005):291-316.  
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Europe” US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke about during the 2003 Iraq war prelude seems to 
give its heart to the US as much as keep its feet in Europe. However, the road to EU membership 
prevailed then, even as it does today, in determining where East European countries must finally stand, 
illustrating (a) how EU’s democratization sees the US as a challenger; and (b) the quid pro quo policy-
linking democratization processes. 
Similarly for the United States, whose drawing-board approach suited the transformation of 
totalitarian Germany and Japan into democracies after World War II, much as it suits Afghanistan and 
Iraq today. True, the United States could not dislodge, not instantly at any rate, kereitsu patterns of 
interest intermediation in Japan or Germany’s close business-government social policy collaboration,31 
but the transformation was distinct where it mattered the most: in the form of government, and thereby the 
democratization pathway taken. By this time the US drawing board was shifting from the ideal to the 
practical, but as Afghanistan, Iraq, and other cases show, the practical was defined through US 
experiences, not Afghani or Iraqi.  
Woodrow Wilson’s intention to “make the world safe for democracy” relied heavily and even 
exclusively on an ideal: self-determination. Although self-determination is a local and not US-inspired 
sentiment and expectation, its international enforcer and advocate was the US before international 
organizations adopted it. When self-determination was replaced as a vehicle towards democracy by anti-
communism during the Cold War, the vanishing US role as vanguard and enforcer suggested democracy 
to be a variable, not as important as self-determination was in the larger picture. It was retrospectively 
argued to be the ends for which communism had to first be eliminated, if necessary by dictators.32 Yet, 
when the Cold War ended and the need for dictators in this line of thinking dissipated, democratization 
continued to serve as the ends rather than means (to other goals, such as the kantian international law or 
cosmopolitan law, or towards a regional trading organization as the EU), with WMDs and terrorism as the 
new threats needing elimination first. Whereas the US entered World War II in reaction to German and 
Japanese behavior, it also intervened in Afghanistan out of a 9/11 reaction; but the pre-emptive Iraqi 
intervention opened a new standard needing a new rationale. Democratization through regime-change 
provided that rationale.  
In the final analysis, arguments, theories, and models addressing the EU experience hold up better 
than their US-oriented counterparts; and the critical reason also shows vividly: the absence of or 
dependence on the military. Although military-driven democratization worked in Germany and Japan 
after World War II, as well as in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), Min Xin Pei and Sara Kasper find 
these to be the only successful cases, out of 17 US-led nation-building intervention,33 down to the present 
time. Fukuyama’s two-steps were not satisfied in the other 13 cases; and Paris’s argument of institution-
before-liberalization (IBL) suggests, unless successful military intervention occurs, even institutions 
cannot become functional. On the other side of the Table 1 ledger, Youngs’s and Pridham’s frameworks 
remain in tact, not just in European experiences, as both testify, also US’s, as Pridham finds. Awakening 
civil society, liberalizing to democratize, and promoting good governance do not need military 
intervention; but even as a soft approach, they worked better than the hard US approach. Clearly 
Youngs’s framework would become irrelevant in Taliban’s Afghanistan and Saddam’s Iraq; but the 
alternate US approach struggles to survive as policy prescription and theoretical formulation in both. 
Driving the argument deeper, Pridham’s framework explaining both the EU and US experiences confirms 
                                                     
31
See Jeffrey Garten, The Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy (New York, NY: 
Times Book, 1992), ch. 4. 
32
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster for American Enterprise Institute, 1982), esp. 23-52. 
33
Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessons From the Past: The American Record on Nation-building, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Briefing Paper # 24, May 2003. 
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the oddity of including military intervention, either on the drawing board or on the ground, if democracy 
is the goal. 
 
Instruments of Democratization: 
For the EU, instruments have been collapsed under the label conditionality, for the US through stages and 
sequences. Two sub-sections address these, while a third compares and contrasts. 
 
EU Conditionality: 
Central to the discussion of EU instruments is the term conditionality. The relevant conditionality, as 
Elena Fierro informs us, is “the field of development cooperation;”34 and as a legion of Europeanists 
remind us,35 it influences European Union membership. Though conditionality did not emerge from EU 
membership criteria, it marks some of the most carefully specified criteria and contexts, distinguishing the 
tighter EU usage of the terms to refer to specific instruments from the looser US usage to refer to intent 
and identity instead. 
 Fierro defines the term “to denote the donor’s practice of tying aid to specific conditions whereby 
recipients remain eligible for aid.”36 Substituting the term donor for democratizer helps the definition 
adjust to the looser US usage of the term. Although the EU formalized membership recruitment in 1993 
through what is called the Copenhagen criteria, even before the collapse of the Iron Curtain, between 
1986 and 1989, the EU was conditioning aid. The Copenhagen criteria, established essentially for EU 
membership but also offering relevant insights on democratization, were fourfold: The candidate country 
had (a) stabilized institutions guaranteeing democracy; (b) a functioning market economically capable of 
competing within the EU; (c) the capacity to adjust to the goals of the political, economic, and monetary 
union; and (d) an understanding of the EU’s capacity to recruit and balance new members in the larger 
comity.37  These represent the political, economic, membership, and institutional obligations of the new 
member. 
 As Heather Grabbe points out, these were further “tightened” between 1998 and 2002: The 
Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy. (PHARE) shifted attention from 
generic reform and democratization to specific EU legislation and policy adjustments; short-term and 
medium-term goals faced new and varied political criteria for Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia; 
strengthening institutional and administrative capacities in banking supervision and financial control; 
internal market reforms in liberalizing capital movements, adopting competition law, and establishing 
anti-trust laws, and more effective border management.38 Klaudijus Maniokas found these to be “stricter 
                                                     
34
Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, International Studies In Human 
Rights, vol., 76 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinis Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 94, but see 93-5.  
35
Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Study of Democracy Assistance and Political 
Conditionality  (Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2001); Jean Grugel, ed, Democracy Without 
Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies (London: Routledge, 1999); Marc 
Maresceau and Erwan Lannon, ed., The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis 
(New York, NY: Palgrave and European Institute, University of Ghent, 2001); Georg Sorensen, Political 
Conditionality (London: F. Cass, 1993); and Olav Stokke, Aid and Political Conditionality (London: F. Cass, 1995).  
36
Fierro, op. cit., 94.  
37
From Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 10, but see 10-31.  
38
Grabbe, op. cit., 16.  
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than the requirements for applicant countries in previous enlargements.”39 Although he finds 
conditionalilty forming “the backbone of [EU’s] new method,” the tightened rules were added to the 6 
“classical principles”: (a) accept the acquis communautaire in full; (b) accession negotiations to focus on 
the practicalities of application; (c) membership expansion necessitates new policy instrument creation in 
addition to existing one; (d) admission to EU’s institutions entail more detailed review after enlargement; 
(e) EU prefers candidates having closer relations with each other; and (f) enlargement reflects the EU’s 
desire to externalize external problems and existing member states to pursue their own interests. 
 On another track, first the European Community (EC), then the EU, adopted what was called 
democracy promotion (DP). Applied largely in the south, especially northern African countries, it began 
informally with the December 1990 Renovated Mediterranean Policy, but culminated in the more formal 
Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) of November 1995. As the EMP continued the democratic reform 
commitment of associational states like Morocco and Tunisia, Richard Youngs argues, this democracy 
promotion goal “was driven more strongly by strategic than by commercial considerations.”40 
 
US Stages and Sequences: 
Just as the EU conditionality transformation was from the general to the specific, the US moved through a 
sequence of distinctive stages. As evident explicitly in Afghanistan and Iraq, but implicitly in Germany 
and Japan, US democratization comes in a rapid 4-phase package: (a) bring about the regime change, 
whether this is in reaction to what the regime did, as in Afghanistan, Germany, and Japan, or in pre-
emption, as in Iraq; (b) establish an interim government by selection to harness the legitimate organs and 
procedures to develop a constitution; (c) shift to a transitional government, elected by the people but still 
screened through US filters, to actually write the constitution, have it ratified, and supervise the resultant 
elections; and (d) announce a democratically elected government based on a constitution providing ample 
rights and freedoms. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the entire process was to be completed within 2 years; 
and although the deadlines were not strictly met, delays were not significant. Yet, democracy is struggling 
to plant roots in both. In Germany and Japan, the process took longer since a formula did not exist, 
necessitating more trials and errors. Roots, however, went deeper. Again, the different outcomes may be a 
function of the legitimacy of intervention, the domestic ethnic calculus, the increasingly mobilized 
populations today, thus raising the ante of expectations and attracting more spectators, as well as the 
higher opportunity costs, not just of alternatives to democracy but also of a larger democracy market 
where the availability of more models means the ability to shop around. 
 As the only case of pre-emption of the four, Iraq went through an additional phase, before the 
interim government was established: administration by the Iraq Governing Council (IGC), selected 
mostly from exiles, by the US through its newly-created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), from 
April 2003. Unlike the 3 other cases, Iraq’s democratization was directly supervised by the occupying 
army: in the other 3 cases, the political and military roles were sufficiently separated as to let 
democratization flourish independently. Along with the supervision came restrictions: the Baathists could 
not participate, the military was totally disbanded, and so forth. Which of these actually contributed to 
Iraq’s democratization failure is hard to isolate, but a number of foregoing arguments apply here: top-
heavy institutions were created without people using them as anchors; bottom-up mobilization initiated, 
not by the US but by transnational groups targeting the US, creating anomie, to say the least, civil war 
                                                     
39Klaudijus Maniokas, “The method of the European Union’s enlargement to the east:a critical appraisal,” Driven to 
Change: The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the East, ed. Antoaneta L. Dimitrova (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2004), 20, but see 18-21.  
40Youngs, “The European Union and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean:a new or disingenuous strategy?” 
Democratization 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002):44, but see 40-62.  
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more realistically; an elected government marooned from the people, ruling from fortresses, and losing 
legitimacy; and, ironically, a surprisingly coherent democratization formula fulfilled in toto. 
 Afghanistan’s case is not nearly as bad for the obvious reason: It did not go through a conjoined 
military-political democratization initiation. Its government is functional, indicating, as in Iraq, the 
formula is not the source of problems; but symptoms of Iraq’s malaise persist in Afghanistan. Without a 
lengthy military shield, Afghanistan’s democratization remains vulnerable. 
 Finally, Germany and Japan made it through for many reasons. First, the strength of remorse for 
having a totalitarian government culminated not in resignation, but acceptance of an alternate regime. 
Second, both had functional economic and political infrastructures even after conflict, easing the return to 
routine and productive lives. Third, neither were desperately divided societies, whether ethnically or 
economically, providing a source of unity Afghanistan and Iraq never had. Fourth, since no 
democratization formula existed, trials and errors by the US permitted more relaxed deadlines. Fifth, as 
victor, the US was still at war, this time with the communists, and since both Germany and Japan were 
expected to play major Cold War outposts, US commanders were much more compassionate than in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where the US appeared as the sole world power, more arrogant than ever before. 
 
Comparisons: 
Two broad differences illustrate the transatlantic orientational difference:  treating defaulters and 
conditionality. Both show the US to be more relaxed than the EU. 
The US approach invites more defaults and showed greater flexibility in accommodating 
defaulters than the EU’s, a subtle transatlantic difference with many causes. First, EU conditionality 
applied to formal club membership, but US conditionality was to open-ended democracy with no 
membership criteria. Secondly, though profound, regime-change in the EU experience did not involve 
military intervention, but for the US, it did. Third, EU regime-change initiatives were directed at countries 
at a higher developmental threshold than were their US counterparts, thus leaving less margin for 
maneuverability in the former than in the latter. Finally, whereas EU conditionality did not intervene with 
other donor-recipient exchanges, just as these other exchanges did not affect EU conditionality, almost all 
donor-recipient exchanges in the US domain had to go through or be channeled by the US. 
According to Fierro, conditionality may be utilized to push the recipient country to adopt a policy 
it would not have pursued otherwise, or even to encourage or accelerate a policy already adopted. 
Similarly, it can be imposed before or after entering a desired relationship, what she calls ex-ante or ex-
post. Given such open-endedness, instruments could be utilized to impose conditions until 
democratization is enhanced or acquired, depending on the country involved, or simply promote 
democracy without conditions. Geofrey Pridham, who utilizes this distinction, sees the US illustrating 
democracy promotion (DP) better than the EU, though the narrow focus of the US just on “electoral 
democracy” does not permit ample comparisons with the wide-ranging EU approach.41 Richard Youngs 
prefers the terms democracy assistance (DA) instead. Describing purpose to be “to fund projects aimed at 
strengthening democratic institutions and practices,” he contrasts this “positive engagement” with the 
“coercive” counterpart of political conditionality (PC), defined as “the possibility of trade and aid 
provisions being linked to degrees of political pluralism.”42 
Behind these orientational differences lie substantive dissimilarities, captured in the following 
sub-sets of this sub-section. 
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Geoffrey Pridham , Designing Democrac EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe 
(Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50. 
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Tone, Thrust, Temperament: 
 
Instruments vary accordingly. Drawing from Youngs’s study, Table 3 compares and contrasts positive 
and coercive instruments for both the EU and the US. While the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first EU 
attempt to promote human rights, democracy, and rule of law within a development framework, the 
Copenhagen criteria adopted the next year set the tone, thrust, and temperament of EU’s approach to 
democratization. The tone was simply to make democracy the pre-condition to all else, particularly 
membership, but as Fierro reminds us, even human rights.43 It was a fundamental analogue to the EU 
variation of economic liberalism, in itself the heart, mind, and soul of trade regionalism. Attention, in 
turn, was directed at East Europe, though colonial legacies also pushed the EU into promoting democracy 
across parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Clearly the end of the Cold War created the opportunity 
to undertake regime-change for both the EU and US; but since the dominant Cold War battlefield was 
“from Stettin to Trieste,” i.e., the Iron Curtain, West Europe had no choice but to take the lead with the 
actual instruments. In particular, West Germany shifted attention almost entirely to absorbing East 
Germans, and since Germany would become the largest financial supplier of EU democracy promotion in 
the 1990s,44 West Germany’s new ostpolitik became the EU’s new priority. Full advantage was taken of 
the opportunity, since the EU invited more new membership applicants than ever before, all from south 
and east Europe. With limited budget, as Youngs calculates, roughly 1% of the EU’s development budget, 
the EU thrust was in the east and south, not elsewhere. Yet, eastern and southern European democracy 
promotion shaped the EU temperament: With hands-on experience, it became a world leader in 
monitoring elections, meaning establishing criteria where and when needed, and promoting human rights-
-a far cry from the Cold War years when agriculture, monetary policy, and market expansion dominated 
EU headlines and agenda. Although agriculture still consumes half the EU budget, foreign and security 
policy, and with it democracy and human rights--what Allan Rosas dubs the Siamese twins”45--
increasingly demand greater attention. The Mediterranean served as an unofficial dividing line in the EU 
vision: Mediterranean African countries would be encouraged, but not obligated, to democratize and 
certainly not with policy leverages as with east and south Europe, or towards becoming full-fledged EU 
members. 
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TABLE 3: TYPES OF DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT 
Types of Engagement: EU: US: 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive engagement (democracy 
promotion or democracy 
assistance): 
*1992 Maastricht Treaty: first to 
introduce promotion of human 
rights, democracy, and rule of 
law within developmental policy 
framework 
*1992: General Affairs Council 
of foreign ministers elevates 
strengthening civil society 
*1993: Copenhagen criteria 
*1994: Initiative for Promotion of 
Democracy and Human Rights 
under European Commission 
management 
  
*Bureau for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor opened under 
Department of State 
*Center for Democracy and 
Government opened under US 
Assistance for International 
Development (AID) 
*National Endowment for 
Democracy begins coordinating 
funding of political parties and 
elections monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive Engagement (political 
conditionality) 
1989: Lomé Convention IV: 
Human Rights respect enshrined, 
but democracy not mentioned and 
legal basis lacking (Substituted 
by Cotonoy Agreement, signed in 
Benin, June 2000)  
*1995: Human Rights and 
Democracy Clause: suspend or 
abrogate contractual relationship 
when democratic  principles 
abused (did not spell out voting 
requirements) 
*June 1997, Amsterdam Treaty: 
Clarified voting requirements; 
since unanimity adopted, 
European Parliament was 
sidelined; called for mixed 
competence (European 
Commission and member states 
 
 
4-phase approach: 
(a) change the regime, usually 
backed up by military means and 
involving conflict; (b) establish 
an interim administration to 
summon a legitimate body to 
initiate shift to constitution-
building; (c) shift to transitional 
government, to some extent 
elected, to prepare the 
constitution, have it ratified, and 
conduct democratic elections; and 
(d) a popularly elected 
government takes over under the 
new constitution 
 
 On the other side of the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War also revitalized the search for 
democracies, but the tone, thrust, and temperament differed. The US temperament was driven by global 
interests in contrast to the EU’s concentric dynamic. One critical dimension of the US global orientation 
was its military pre-eminence: Unlike the EU, the US had to calculate military or strategic interests in 
determining its position on democracy. For example, whether it would be worth pushing democracy in 
Saudi Arabia or not when inexpensive oil imports could be seriously threatened at a time of market 
expansion and increased competition. The consequence resonated with the Cold War US stand: a soft 
approach to democracy. It would be prioritized at the rhetorical level, non-governmental organizations 
and social groups would be encouraged to campaign for it, but few, if any, instruments would be 
galvanized on a generic basis to enhance democracy--somewhat similar structurally to the EU’s African 
option. 
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Given the long history of US aid being conditioned, one finds the thrust to be more indirect than 
direct: rather than condition democracy, the Cold War tendency was to guard against the return to, or 
embrace of, communism. After the Cold War, new agencies took up the drive to promote democracy: the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in particular, not just through its publications, but also 
election monitoring and institution-building support; the State Department’s creation of the Bureau for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the Agency for International Development (AID) agency of 
Center for Democracy and Governance.  
Unlike the EU, the tone was hot heightened. The US still wanted democracy, but only by default: 
by removing communism, then terrorism. In other words, more funds went into the wars against 
communism and terrorism than in promoting democracy; or to put it another way, an anti-communist or 
anti-terrorist claim carried more weight than a claim on behalf of democracy. George W. Bush’s “with us 
or against us” warning had little to do with either protecting or promoting democracy. Since the US was 
spending as much as the EU on these tasks, as Youngs shows,46 one might argue democratization was not 
a top-priority in either. It was useful, but other interests mattered much more.  
Moreover, the war against terrorism provided opportunities to claim democracy leadership. One 
opportunity came in the form of regime-change. Thus, just as West Europeans also sought regime-change 
in East and South Europe when the Cold War ended, the US also embarked upon regime-change 
worldwide--first in Latin America and through an economic policy approach of liberalism, which 
produced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade of the Americas 
(FTAA) in the decade before 9/11; and especially in “rogue” countries the world over after 9/11 through 
military intervention. Afghanistan paved the way at reinventing governments, and thereby ideologies and 
ultimately political cultures. Iraq followed suit. 
 In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US adopted similar blueprints, heavy on goals and deadlines 
within breathtakingly short time-spans, but soft on actual conditions or penalties to be imposed if those 
deadlines were not kept or the goals were not met. This was the transatlantic difference: Whereas 
democracy remained a variable, intangibly anchored, and subordinated to strategic interests for the US, 
for the EU it had a fixed definition, was tangible through the policy requirements, and where pursued, a 
top priority. As Table 3 points out, both countries had the tools, but only the EU utilized them 
purposefully. Why the EU could do what the US would not takes us to another difference, this one to do 
with the rationale: Democracy promotion was necessary for EU membership, but fulfilled only strategic 
US interests; in turn, DP reinforced EU unity and identity in and of itself, but fed into other US interests 
claiming unity and identity, such as Bush’s “with or against us” call. 
 Pridham’s comparisons echo these findings from a different angle. His five dimensions 
appraising the scope and mechanisms of DP and DC show this: (a) political-systemic, addressing political 
dynamics from a systemic perspective, where the system is defined by fulfilling EU membership 
obligations, for example, set within the European Commission context, or the Council of Ministers, and 
so forth; (b) party-political, examining the creation or development of political parties, especially as they 
align with European-level counterparts; (c) election monitoring, which is more interested in how elections 
are conducted and if key criteria have been satisfied; (d) political-societal, a context capturing civil 
society dynamics; and (e) political-cultural, which addresses such issues as educating the masses and 
streamlining human rights responses. 
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TABLE 4: PRIDHAM’S  MEASUREMENT OF DP AND DC THROUGH SCOPE AND 
 MECHANISMS: EU-US COMPARISONS 
 
Dimensions: Top-down: Bottom-up: 
Political-systemic (local 
government, elite training): 
EU: its own institutions 
US: its own institutions 
EU: PHARE 
Party-political (transnational elite 
socialization): 
EU: transnational party 
cooperation 
EU: activists 
US: activists 
 
Election monitoring: 
EU: Council of Europe 
Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
  
 OSCE 
 
Political-societal (civil society 
issues): 
EU: national governments 
US: national governments 
EU: PHARE, NGOs, private 
foundations 
US private foundations, NGOs 
Political cultural (political 
education, human rights) 
EU: Council of Europe EU: private foundations 
US: private foundations 
 Source: Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-
Communist Europe (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50-1. 
 
 When examined along top-down and bottom-up perspectives for both the EU and US, he finds: 
(a) the US as a DP leader, EU the DC leader; (b) EU showing greater top-down than bottom-up 
engagement; (c) top-down orientations in inter-governmental agencies like NATO and the World Bank; 
and (d) transnational agencies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
balancing both approaches. 
 
Placement in a Dynamic Global Context: 
Pursuing democracy and democratizing can not be the only tasks of any given government. Security must 
be provided, commerce allowed to flow, education be imparted, healthcare be maintained, and a host of 
other tasks constantly demand governmental attention. How, then, do the pursuits of democracy and 
democratization fit into this busy agenda? Three sub-sections address this by comparing (a) 
democratization checklists; (b) exogenous and endogenous factors; and (c) time thresholds. 
 
Democratization Checklists: 
 
One approach to an answer is to redirect the checklist Albert Somit and Steven A Peterson developed 
from the democratization literature. Meant for a study of specific instances of US-driven democratization, 
its 9 elements can be utilized here for a comparative EU-US study. Table 5 illustrates. 
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TABLE 5: CHECKLIST FOR SUCCESSFUL NATION-BUILDING: EU-US COMPARISONS 
 
Checklist: EU: US: 
1. Willingness by democratizing 
country to invest personnel and 
resources: 
Yes, but within limits, especially 
of humans 
Yes, has been fairly open-ended 
2. Willingness to keep military 
and civilian presence: 
Yes over patience, no over 
civilian and military presence 
Yes 
3. Commitment to reduce post-
conflict deaths from combat: 
No examples to rely on; and not 
immediately attractive 
Yes 
4. Appreciation of local culture 
and avoidance of arrogance: 
EU enlargement proceeds very 
frankly on “asymmetrical” basis: 
Mixed report 
5. Restore infrastructure and 
human capital: 
Yes, through its many programs Yes 
6. Remove from the key positions 
those associated with past regime: 
Not a task diligently pursued Yes, diligently pursued 
7. Be able to understand deeply 
divided countries reduce chances 
of success: 
Yes, but intervention has been 
economic where this question has 
not been important 
Yes, but largely ignored given the 
reasons for intervention; hope 
that intervention reduces inter-
ethnic divisions 
8. Streamline external and 
internal interests: 
Yes, and emphatically so with 
regards EU 
Not a priority if outside country is 
not the US 
9. Rebuild social, economic, 
political institutions as base for 
liberal reforms: 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 A first-level analysis of Table 5 finds two critical differences. First, intervention, especially 
military, has not been a EU practice and is not an option the EU is likely to pursue, although it is the very 
essence of US regime-change since many regimes needing change are in conflict-ridden countries or 
inimical to US interests. Second, the subdued EU tone to many of the checklist questions contrasts with 
US enthusiasm. One might argue the checklist suits the US since it was developed largely with US 
experiences in mind, thus reaffirming US-EU differences. Previous comparative frameworks utilized, for 
example, Youngs’s, also carried a similar EU bias, thus offsetting the checklist US bias, and ultimately 
accentuating EU-US differences. 
 
 If we turn to the Somit-Peterson checklist for the emergence of democracy in targeted countries, 
we again see contrasts. Table 6 illustrates. Also drawn from US experiences, this check-list is more 
favorably slanted towards the EU. Among the critical differences, first, the EU is better able than the US 
in facilitating democratic practices and establishing functional institutions; second, economic 
development faces more favorable circumstances under EU efforts than US, although this may again be a 
function of the US democratizing more difficult countries than the EU; and third, the more obscure EU 
seeds of conflict than in US disguise the ongoing EU membership process. 
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TABLE 6: CHECKLIST FOR EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: EU-US COMPARISONS 
Checklist: EU: US: 
1. Functioning government 
institutions: 
Yes Mixed report 
2. Internal peace (e.g., no civil 
wars): 
Yes Largely no 
3. Adequate levels of economic 
development: 
Yes Largely no 
4. Adequate levels of education: Yes Largely no 
5. Existence of basic liberties: Yes Largely no 
6. Lack of previous authoritarian 
regime: 
Yes Yes 
7. Pro-democratic  “out-elite” Yes Yes 
8. Pro-democracy civic 
dispositions: 
Yes Yes, but constrained 
9. Religious conflict is absent: Yes Not always 
10. Ethnic, tribal, and racial 
conflict is absent: 
Largely Not really 
 
Exogenous and Endogenous Factors: 
How do exogenous and external factors fare in both cases? Table 7 lists some relevant exogenous and 
external factors, before comparing and contrasting the two cases. 
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TABLE 7: EXOGENOUS AND EXTERNAL FACTORS: EU-US COMPARISONS 
Exogenous and External 
Factors: 
EU: US: 
 
 
 
 
1. Key characteristics of the 
democratization sponsor (EU or 
US): 
 
Multi-membered group; 
democracy is passport to joining 
an economic club; EU 
socialization proceeds at multiple 
levels and over multiple years of 
grooming; membership idea is 
attractive, grooming is tough, and 
end-product is one-size-fits-all 
European  
Single-membered sponsor (US 
Alone); democratization and 
liberalization often proceed 
simultaneously; multiple-level 
process but time-frame usually a 
lot tighter; democratization 
usually without choice, 
adjustment is difficult; and en-
product rarely achieved, 
especially if one-size-fits-all US 
type 
 
 
 
2. How singular is the model 
target countries must follow? 
In satisfying Copenhagen criteria, 
it is very singular: a European 
model devoid of any national or 
statist pattern; in developing 
political structures, target 
countries have many options to 
follow from the many EU 
members 
 
Both in economic and political 
anchors, the US model is heavily 
advocated, creating greater 
singularity (presidential favored 
over prime minister in form of 
government, and so forth) 
 
3. To what extent can other 
external forces contribute to 
target country democratization? 
The door is open, but EU 
membership imposes a sine qua 
non trajectory target countries do 
not which to deviate from or 
subordinate 
The door is open, but through US 
filters, both politically and 
economically (corporations, for 
example) 
 
 
4. Prospects for international 
organizations: 
Mostly welcomed, but if EU has 
counterpart agencies, they get 
preference; with so detailed EU 
grooming, international 
organizations have lesser scope 
for engagement 
 
Washington Consensus 
institutions (IMF, IBRD) very 
welcomed, UN utilized as 
instrument of last resort 
5. Room to diverge from 
democratization sponsors (EU or 
US): 
Yes, as evident in 2003 Iraq war: 
it divided EU membership 
Theoretically yes, but practically 
difficult 
 
 Five dimensions chosen to fill in analytical cracks in the relevant literatures offer quite a 
mouthful of contrasts. Highlighting the key characteristic of the EU and US in their democratization 
pursuits, the first dimension informs us why both enter the game with very different baggage and 
capacities. As a group of several countries, the EU cannot impose the styles and patterns of any one 
country, but it does require, by virtue of Article 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union and Article 177(2) 
of the TEC, democratic credentials for membership. By contrast, the US is a single-member democracy 
sponsor, and while the only passport to creating democracy is to have an authoritarian government which 
can be demolished, both liberalization and democratization efforts proceed simultaneously. Progress is 
more loosely monitored by the US compared to the EU, and while both establish thresholds in their 
pursuits, the EU has been more stringent in satisfying them than the US. For example, Afghanistan and 
Iraq frequently missed deadlines in creating constitutions, but the US was more flexible than the EU 
would have been to a candidate country not fulfilling any particular criterion. 
23 
 
  
EU democratization necessitates the candidate country to socialize with a variety of EU 
institutions and policy networks, something the US encourages but does not require. Consequently, over 
the many years of socializing, EU candidate members acquire a europeanness, in spite of the occasional 
bouts of frustration from not fully satisfying any given membership criterion; but the US does not 
normally allow a long leash of time, and though an americanness is desired, it is usually not required nor 
obtained. Germany and Japan continue to retain idiosyncratic practices, such as in interest intermediation 
over policy-making; while Afghanistan and Iraq, if a first-sight is any indicator, are quite unlikely to 
mirror the US in many areas. 
Against the background of this closer EU-identity imperative and the more flexible US 
counterpart, the second dimension asks if the target countries must follow their patrons as a model, and 
how singular is the patron itself. In satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries have no choice 
but to follow the singular EU model, but fortunately for them, this model is the net product of several 
members, not any one of them in particular. By contrast, the US model is singular, and the target country 
is heavily encouraged to follow US preferences over both political and economic policies. There is no 
written law they must follow US patterns, unlike the EU counterparts where convergence is a 
requirement. 
The third dimension explores other external forces, whether they can chip in to the democratizing 
process, and what consequences may ensue. Both the EU and US invite other actors to contribute, and 
both also have their own filtration systems. Since the EU is interested in democratization to determine 
membership, no matter how many other external actors engaged, the bottom-line remains a variety of EU 
preferences those other actors can do nothing about. While the US does not impose such a sine qua non 
trajectory, it is cognizant of the nature and extent of participation of other actors, be they non-
governmental organizations, opportunity-seeking corporations, or a variety of international organizations.  
In fact, the fourth dimension treats these international organizations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and 
the UN, separately. They are all welcome by both the EU and US, but they both have implicit or explicit 
qualifiers. For example, EU target countries typically go through such a lengthy grooming period, there is 
not much more these organizations can do, unless an emergency arises. Even in such instances, if the EU 
has counterpart arrangements, these are forwarded in lieu of the IMF, World Bank, or the UN. For the 
US, Washington Consensus institutions like the IMF and the World Bank normally do not pose any 
problems, and often go hand-in-hand with US development or democratization efforts. Once in a while, 
the UN becomes a problem due to its wider audience and membership, which the US normally tries to 
avoid. 
 Finally, the fifth dimension inquires if the target countries can diverge in their preferences from 
the sponsoring agency, the EU or US. This seems to be more possible in the EU, in part owing to its large 
membership, than with the US. Although not prohibited by the US, divergences in any one area could 
result in reduced rewards or withheld promises in another, creating a disincentive to defect. 
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Time Thresholds: 
 
Given the contrasting performances of Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and Afghanistan and Iraq, 
on the other, why has US pursuits of democratization not produced the uniform results the EU pursuit 
has: Table 8 addresses this by creating time thresholds as comparative dimensions. 
 
TABLE 8: TIME THRESHOLDS & EU-US DEMOCRATIZATION RESPONSES 
 
Time-thresholds: EU: US: 
 
1. Pre-World War II: “making the 
world safe for democracy” with 
self determination as instrument 
No EU existed, but many 
European countries with colonies 
rejected self-determination; and 
many were undergoing regime-
change themselves 
As much a US rhetoric as reality: 
first instances of regime-change 
started (the Philippines, Cuba, 
Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti,in 
that order) 
2. Cold War era (1945-1986): 
“making the world safe for 
democracy” by quashing 
communism: 
US security umbrella helped 
consolidate fledgling 
democracies, institutionalize 
liberalism, and initiate regional 
identity 
Friendly dictators fighting 
communism more valuable than 
democracy-seeking groups (Iran, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Indonesia,  Turkey, Egypt) 
 
 
3. Post-Cold War era: “making 
the world safe for democracy” by 
promoting democracy: 
 
 
East and South European 
opportunity: to democratize, 
expand membership, and seek 
role as democratization leader 
East European opportunity 
extended to Soviet-successor 
states and across Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America: greater 
emphasis on liberalization than 
democratization; NGOs growth to  
spearhead democracy abroad 
 
 
 
4. Post-9/11 (2001-):“making the 
world safe for democracy” by 
eliminating terrorism: 
 
 
Moment of consolidating East 
and South European membership; 
champion democracy elsewhere 
through electoral monitors 
Regime-change given more 
urgent billing, resort to military 
intervention elevated as 
instrument; democratization 
rhetorical headline, but 
subordinated to stamping 
terrorism out 
 
 Four dimensions show four interpretations of the Wilsonian maxim of making the world safe for 
democracy. The first is identified in terms of self-determination, advocated by the United States, 
essentially against European colonial powers, and a globally popular position to adopt as well as lodge 
among the fundamentals of the emerging international organization, the League of Nations. It was a time 
when the US could have become what it did in the fourth time-threshold: the sole world power. 
Interestingly in this fourth phase, when the maxim was interpreted in terms of ridding the world of 
terrorism, the US stood aloof, and at times, against  the European current, not just in terms of 
democratization, but over other issues as well. Three features made this fourth phase an entirely different 
era: there was no need to create an international organization, and the dominant one existing, the UN, 
stood as handicapped in promoting democracy as the League of Nations was empowered to seek it 
(through self-determination and mandates); the US had a democratization game plan, which it didn’t in 
Wilson’s time, as well as domestic support to implement it; and there now existed a competitive thrust to 
pursuing democracy, with the EU promoting the same goal by other means. 
 In between, as the campaign to spread democracy waned during the Cold War, independent 
democracy movements in southern and eastern Europe, in what Samuel P. Huntington and others call the 
25 
 
third democratic wave, brought the European Community on to the democratization stage. The US was 
left to catch-up for at least two reasons: Its authoritarian Cold War clients could not be automatically 
strung out to dry when the Cold War ended; and, led by West Germany, European countries began 
thrashing out the nuts and bolts of democratization more vividly, even if the efforts primarily sought a 
facilitative economic order for EU membership. 
 The rest became democracy history. Democracy came out of the development planning cocoon, 
demanding its own independent plans, which, once initiated by the EU, among others, spiraled into 
pushing other countries, such as the United States, to create their own conditions or thresholds and 
confront other countries whether they wanted it or not, were ready for it or not. As a conglomeration of 
countries with limited available resources, the EU would not take on this campaign at the global level, 
except in rhetoric; but the United States was ready, willing, and able to do so, at the least to compensate 
for a historical negligence, at most to remodel the world in its own image. Unlike the war against 
communism when democracy could be left to languish on the back-burner, in the war against terrorism, 
democracy cannot but be given greater glow. 
 In the final analysis, both the EU and the US have their own distinctive democracy orientations 
and democratization formulas, but one seemingly echoes off the other: Without the US-driven Cold War, 
who knows what might have happened, and when, to East European democratization; and without the 
West European interest in East European democratization, who knows if the US would have even 
mustered a democratization formula. Both could end up in the same ballpark and with similar guises of 
democracy, but more likely they will give democracy their own different stripes. 
 
Conclusions: 
  
A survey of what democracy broadly means, how democratization is spelled out, why certain instruments 
are used, and where democracy lies in the larger compass of domestic and external interests point to two 
different transatlantic protagonists. Both the US and West European countries have been shifting their 
historical orientations, the former from a relative bottom-up approach towards a top-down position, the 
latter shifting towards the bottom-up without abandoning the top-down. Where they belong in the global 
context might have a lot to do with this shift: World leadership demands a proactive democratization 
position, whereas would-be leaders can be more pedantic about the task while basking in the shadows of 
the leader; and so it was, the US adopting a more decisive top-down approach the more it behaved like a 
world leader, and the EU increasingly creating quid pro quo democratic opportunities the more robust its 
regional organization became. In between the definition and the larger picture, the two sides implemented 
different strategies utilizing different instruments: In part as a world leader, the US could make 
democracy the ends of policy alignments, the EU the means; in other words, a looser US definition of 
democracy permitted less rigid democratization beginning no less on the battlefield, but a tighter EU 
counterpart narrowed the processes to specific instruments. In neither is democracy made a vital interest, 
since the US ranks a favorable global alignment much higher as does the EU economic integration. Yet, 
by simultaneously championing democracy, both lock themselves and other countries in. 
The 4-stage US approach may go globally farther than the multidimensional EU counterpart, but 
the EU approach may sink regionally deeper than the US formula: Not many countries can fulfill the EU 
criteria, and even if they do, EU membership or privileged trading arrangements, remain prohibitive. The 
option to defect to the other side, that is, the US, opens up, and on less stringent terms; and even though 
many countries find the spotty US democracy record attractive, very few, if any, would volunteer to begin 
with a military conflict. Democracy’s multiplying facets is but a reaction to the many country-cultures it 
must adapt to. Promoting it necessitates flexibility. Though the US shows this characteristic more than the 
EU, reactions and criteria flexibility no longer seem sufficient to explain democracy. 
